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In our digital and connected societies, the development of social net-
works, online shopping, and reputation systems raises the question
of how individuals use social information, and how it affects their
decisions. We report experiments performed in France and Japan,
in which subjects could update their estimates after having received
information from other subjects. We measure and model the impact
of this social information at individual and collective scales. We ob-
serve and justify that when individuals have little prior knowledge
about a quantity, the distribution of the logarithm of their estimates
is close to a Cauchy distribution. We find that social influence helps
the group improve its properly defined collective accuracy. We quan-
tify the improvement of the group estimation when additional con-
trolled and reliable information is provided, unbeknownst to the sub-
jects. We show that subjects’ sensitivity to social influence permits
to define five robust personality traits and increases with the differ-
ence between personal and group estimates. We then use our data
to build and calibrate a model of collective estimation, to analyze the
impact on the group performance of the quantity and quality of infor-
mation received by individuals. The model quantitatively reproduces
the distributions of estimates and the improvement of collective per-
formance and accuracy observed in our experiments. Finally, our
model predicts that providing a moderate amount of incorrect infor-
mation to individuals can counterbalance the human cognitive bias
to systematically underestimate quantities, and thereby improve col-
lective performance.
social influence | wisdom of crowds | collective intelligence | self-
organization | computational modelling
In a globalized, connected, and data-driven world, people relyincreasingly on online services to fulfill their needs. AirBnB,
Amazon, Ebay, or Trip Advisor, to name just a few, have in
common the use of feedback and reputation mechanisms [1]
to rate their products, services, sellers, and customers. Ideas
and opinions increasingly propagate through social networks
such as Facebook or Twitter [2–4], to the point that they have
the power to cause political shifts [5]. In this context, it is
crucial to understand how social influence affects individual
decision-making, and its resulting effects at the level of a
group.
Two observations can be made about these collective phe-
nomena: (a) people often make decisions not simultaneously
but sequentially [6, 7], and (b) decision tasks involve judgmen-
tal/subjective aspects. Social psychological research on group
decision-making has established that consensual processes vary
greatly depending on the demonstrability of answers [8]. When
the solution is easy to demonstrate, people often follow the
“truth-wins” process, whereas when the demonstrability is low,
they are much more susceptible to “majoritarian” social in-
fluence [9]. Thus, collective estimation tasks where correct
solutions cannot be easily demonstrated are particularly well
suited for measuring the impact of social influence on individ-
uals’ decisions. Galton’s original work [10] on estimation tasks
shows that the mean or median of independent estimates of
a quantity can be impressively close to its true value. This
phenomenon has been popularized as the Wisdom of Crowds
(WOC) effect [11] and is generally used to measure a group’s
performance. Yet, because of the independence condition, it
does not consider potential effects of social influence.
In recent years, it has been debated whether social influence
is detrimental to the WOC or not: some works argue that
it reduces group diversity without improving the collective
error [12, 13], while others show that it is beneficial, if one
defines collective performance otherwise [14, 15]. One or two
of the following measures were used to define performance and
diversity: let us define Ei as the estimate of individual i, 〈Ei〉
as its average over all individuals, and T as the true value of the
quantity to estimate. Then, GD = 〈(Ei − 〈Ei〉)2〉 is a measure
of group diversity, and G = (〈Ei〉 − T )2 and G′ = 〈(Ei − T )2〉
are two natural measures of the group performance. However,
these estimators are not independent, since G′ = G+GD, which
shows that a decrease in diversity GD is beneficial to group
performance, as measured by G′, contrary to the general claim.
Significance Statement
Digital technologies deeply impact the way people interact.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand how social influence af-
fects individual and collective decision-making. We performed
experiments where subjects had to answer questions and then
revise their opinion after knowing the average opinion of some
previous participants. Moreover, unbeknownst to the subjects,
we added a controlled number of virtual participants always
giving the true answer, thus precisely controlling social informa-
tion. Our experiments and data-driven model show how social
influence can help a group of individuals collectively improve
its performance and accuracy in estimation tasks, depending
on the quality and quantity of information provided. Our model
also shows how giving slightly incorrect information could drive
the group to a better performance.
B.J., C.S., G.T. designed research; B.J., H.K., R.E., S.C., A.B., T.K., C.S., G.T. performed research;
B.J., C.S., G.T. analyzed data; B.J., C.S., G.T. wrote the paper, and T.K. provided critical insights.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: guy.theraulaz@univ-tlse3.fr
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
02
58
5v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  7
 N
ov
 20
17
DR
AF
T
Later research showed that social influence helps the group
perform better, if one considers only information coming from
informed [16], successful [17], or confident [18] individuals.
We will show that these traits are actually strongly related.
The way social information is defined also matters: providing
individuals with the arithmetic or geometric mean of estimates
of other individuals has different consequences [18].
Besides these methodological issues, it is difficult to pre-
cisely analyze and characterize the impact of social influence on
individual estimates without controlling the quality and quan-
tity of information that is exchanged between subjects. Indeed,
human groups are often composed of individuals with hetero-
geneous expertise, so that in a collective estimation task, one
cannot rigorously control the quality and quantity of shared
social information, and the quantification of individual sensi-
tivity to this information is hence very delicate. To overcome
this problem, we performed experiments in which subjects
were asked to estimate quantities about which they had very
little prior knowledge (low demonstrability of answers), before
and after having received social information. The interactions
between subjects were sequential and local, while most previ-
ous works have used a global kind of interaction, all individuals
being provided some information (estimates of other individu-
als in the group) at the same time [12–14, 18, 19]. From the
individuals’ estimates and the social information they received,
we were able to deduce their sensitivity to social influence.
Moreover, by introducing virtual experts (artificial subjects
providing the true answer, thus affecting social information)
in the sequence of estimates – without the subjects being
aware of it – we were able to control the quantity and quality
of information provided to the subjects, and to quantify the
impact of this information on the group performance.
Our results show that the subjects’ reaction to social influ-
ence is heterogeneous and depends on the distance between
personal and group opinion. We then use the data to build
and calibrate a model of collective estimation, to analyze and
predict the impact of information quantity and quality received
by individuals on the performances at the group level.
Experimental design
Subjects were asked to answer questions in which they had to
estimate various social, geographical, astronomical quantities,
or the number or length of objects in a picture. For each
question, the experiment proceeded in two steps: subjects
had first to provide their personal estimate Ep. Then, after
receiving the social information I, they were asked to give a
new estimate E. I is defined as the geometric mean of the τ
previous estimates E (τ = 1 or 3). Subjects answered each
question sequentially (see SI Appendix, Fig. S1), and were not
told the value of τ . Since humans think in terms of orders
of magnitude [20], we used the geometric mean for I – which
averages orders of magnitude – rather than the arithmetic one.
Virtual “experts” providing the true value E = T for each
question were inserted at random into the sequence of partici-
pants (see SI Appendix, Fig. S1). For each sequence involving
20 human participants, we controlled the number n = 0, 5,
15, 80, and hence the percentage ρ = n
n+20 = 0%, 20%, 43%
or 80% of virtual experts. The social information delivered
to human participants, being the geometric mean of previous
estimates, is hence strongly affected by these virtual experts.
When providing their estimates Ep and E, subjects had to
report their confidence level in their answer on a Likert scale
ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high), and were asked to
choose the reason that best explained their second estimate
among a list of 8 possibilities. We used initial conditions for
the social information I chosen reasonably far from the true
answer T , and imposed loose limits to the estimates subjects
could give, to prevent them from answering too absurdly. All
graphs presented here are based on the 29 questions (5394× 2
prior and final estimates) from the experiment performed in
France. A similar experiment was conducted in Japan, for
which all results can be found in SI Appendix, where the full
experimental protocol is described in detail.
The aims and procedures of the experiments conformed to
the ethical rules imposed by the Toulouse School of Economics
and the Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences
at Hokkaido University. All subjects in France and Japan
provided written consent for their participation.
Results
Distribution of individual estimates. Previous works have
shown that distributions of independent individual estimates
are generally highly right-skewed, while distributions of their
common logarithm are much more symmetric [12, 13, 18].
This is because humans think in terms of orders of magnitude,
especially when large quantities are involved, which makes
the logarithmic scale more natural to represent human esti-
mates [20]. In these works, participants were mostly asked
“easy” questions for which they had good prior knowledge
(high demonstrability), such that the answers ranged over 1 to
2 orders of magnitude at most [12–14, 17–19, 21–23]. In order
to ensure that little information was present before the inclu-
sion of our virtual experts, and to more clearly identify the
impact of social influence, we selected “hard” questions (low
demonstrability). These questions involve very large quantities
and answers span several orders of magnitude, making the
log-transform of estimates even more relevant. To compare
quantities that can differ by orders of magnitude, we normalize
each estimate E by the true answer T to the question at hand,
and define the log-transformed estimate X = log(E
T
). Note
that the log-transform of the actual answer T is X = 0.
Figure 1A shows the distribution of X before and after
social information has been provided to the subjects (see
also SI Appendix, Table S1). Although such distributions
have often been presented as close to Gaussian distributions
[13, 18], we find that they are much better described by Cauchy
distributions, because of their fat tails which account for the
non negligible probability of estimates extremely far from the
truth. The Cauchy probability distribution function reads
f(X,m, σ) = 1
pi
σ
(X −m)2 + σ2 , [1]
where m is the center/median and σ is the width of the
distribution. SI Appendix, Fig. S2A shows the distribution of
estimates in the Japan experiment, and SI Appendix, Fig. S2B
shows that, when the same questions were asked, distributions
of personal estimates in France and Japan are almost identical.
For the Cauchy distribution, the mean and standard devia-
tion are not defined. Therefore, good estimators of m and σ
are respectively the median and half the interquartile range
(the difference between the third and first quartile) of the
experimental distribution. In the following, mp (respectively
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m) and σp (respectively σ) will refer to the median and half
the interquartile range of the experimental distribution before
social influence (respectively after social influence).
Cauchy and Gaussian distributions belong to the so-called
stable distributions family. More generally, {Xi} being a set
of estimates drawn from a symmetric probability distribution
f characterized by its center m and width σ, we define the
weighted average X ′ =
∑
i
piXi, with
∑
i
pi = 1. f is a stable
distribution if X ′ has the same probability distribution f as
the original Xi, up to the new width σ′. Indeed, the center
m remains the same due to the condition
∑
i
pi = 1, but the
width may decrease after averaging (law of large numbers),
depending on the stable distribution f considered. Cauchy
and Gaussian represent two extremes of the stable distribution
family, Lévy distributions being intermediate cases: for the
Cauchy distribution, the width σ remains unchanged, whereas
the narrowing of σ is maximum for the Gaussian distribution
(see SI Appendix). In the case of actual human estimates,
the relevance of a certain distribution f can be related to the
degree of prior knowledge of the group. When individuals have
no idea about the answer to a question, the weighted average
of arbitrary answers cannot be statistically better (σ′ < σ)
or worse (σ′ > σ) than the arbitrary answers themselves,
leading to a Cauchy distribution for these estimates (the only
distribution for which σ′ = σ). However, when there is a
good prior knowledge, one expects that combining answers
gives a better statistical estimate (σ′ < σ; Gaussian). When
the quantity to estimate is closely related to general intuition
(ages, dates...), estimates should hence follow a Gaussian-like
distribution, while when individuals have very little knowledge
about the answer, as in our experiment, estimates should be
Cauchy-like distributed. The rationale for naturally observing
stable distributions is explained in SI Appendix.
We use the term Cauchy-like because Figure 1A shows that
the distributions of prior (Xp) and final (X) estimates are
slightly skewed toward low estimates (X < 0), reminiscent of
the human cognitive bias to underestimate numbers, due to
the nonlinear internal representation of quantities [24]. As
we will show, this phenomenon has strong implications on
the influence of information provided to the group. We also
observe a clear sharpening of the distribution of estimates
after social influence, mainly due to the presence of the virtual
experts, hence affecting the value of the social information
M = log( I
T
), and ultimately, the final estimate X of the actual
subjects. This sharpening becomes stronger as the percentage
of experts increases (SI Appendix, Fig. S3).
Moreover, consistently with our introductory discussion
of the measurement methods of group performance, we pro-
pose the two following indicators: (1) collective performance:
|median(Xi)|, which represents how close the center of the
distribution is to 0 (the log-transform of the true value T ),
and (2) collective accuracy: median(|Xi|), which is a measure
of the proximity of individual estimates to the true value.
Distribution of individual sensitivities to social influence. Af-
ter having received social information, an individual i may
reconsider her personal estimate Epi. The natural way for
humans to aggregate estimates is to use the median [22] or
the geometric mean [18], which both tend to reduce the effect
of outliers. Here, the social information we provided to the
subject was the geometric mean of the τ previous answers
(including that of the virtual experts providing the true answer
Fig. 1. A. Probability distribution function (PDF) of log-transformed normalized esti-
mates X = log(ET ), where E is the subject’s estimate and T is the true answer
to the question, before (blue) and after (red) social influence. All conditions (ρ, τ )
are aggregated (see SI Appendix, Fig. S3 for each ρ). Plain lines are the results
of our model based on Cauchy distributions, while dotted lines are Gaussian fits; B.
PDF of sensitivities to social influence S. The numbers at the top of the panel are
the probabilities for each category of behavior: contradict (Cont: S < 0), keep (Ke:
S = 0), compromise (Comp: 0 < S < 1), adopt (Ad: S = 1) and overreact (Ov:
S > 1). Experimental data are shown in black, and numerical simulations of the
model are in red. The full range of S goes from−30 to 200. The figure is limited to
the interval [-1, 2] and the values of S outside this range were grouped in the boxes
S < −1 and S > 2.
Ei = T ), Ii = (
∏i−1
j=i−τ Ej)
1
τ . Moreover, one can always rep-
resent the new estimate Ei as the weighted geometric average
of the personal estimate Epi and the social information Ii.
Hence, we can uniquely define the sensitivity to social influ-
ence Si, by Ei = Epi
1−Si IiSi . Si = 0 corresponds to subjects
keeping their initial estimates, while Si = 1 corresponds to
subjects adopting the estimate of their peers. In terms of
log-transformed variables Xi = log(EiT ), we obtain
Xi = (1− Si)Xpi + SiMi, [2]
where the log-transformed social information is simply the
arithmetic mean Mi = 1τ
∑i−1
j=i−τXj , and thus Si =
Xi−Xpi
Mi−Xpi
.
Note that in this language, Si is simply the barycenter coor-
dinate of the final estimate in terms of the initial personal
estimate and the social information.
Figure 1B shows that the experimental distribution of S has
a bell-shaped part, that we roughly assimilate to a Gaussian,
with two additional Dirac peaks exactly at S = 0 and S = 1
(see SI Appendix, Table S2 for numerical values). Five types of
behavioral responses can be identified: keeping one’s opinion
(peak at S = 0), adopting the group’s opinion (peak at S = 1),
making a compromise between one’s opinion and the group’s
opinion (0 < S < 1), overreacting to social information (S >
1), and contradicting it (S < 0). Quite surprisingly, responses
that consist in overreacting and contradicting are generally
overlooked in previous works [21–23, 25], either considered as
noise and simply not taken into account, or sometimes included
into the peaks at S = 0 and S = 1, despite these behaviors
being not negligible (especially overreacting). We find that
the median of S is 0.34, in agreement with previous results
[15, 18, 25], meaning that individuals tend to give more weight
to their own opinion than to information coming from others
[14, 19]. Moreover, the distribution of S for the experiment
performed in Japan and for men and women (in France) are
very similar to that of Figure 1B (see SI Appendix, Fig. S4).
We find that the subjects’ behavioral reactions are highly
consistent, reflecting robust differences in personality or gen-
eral knowledge: in each session, according to the way subjects
Jayles et al. PNAS | November 8, 2017 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 3
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modified their estimates on average in the first 24 questions,
we split the subjects into three subgroups. We first define
“confident” subjects as the quarter of the group minimizing
〈|Sq|〉q, where q is the index of the questions (i.e. the subjects
who were on average closest to S = 0) and the “followers” as
the quarter of the group minimizing 〈|1−Sq|〉q (i.e. closest to
S = 1). The other half of the group is defined as the “average”
subjects. SI Appendix, Fig. S5 shows the distributions of S
for the three subgroups, computed from questions 25 to 29.
The differences are striking (see also SI Appendix, Fig. S6):
for the group of confident subjects, the peak at S = 0 is about
7 times higher than the peak at S = 1, while for the group
of followers, it is less than twice larger. Moreover, the distri-
bution for average subjects is found to be very close to the
global distribution, shown in Figure 1B.
Fig. 2. A. Mean sensitivity to social influence S against the distance D = Xp −M
between personal estimate Xp and social information M (group estimate). Full black
circles correspond to experimental data, while red empty circles are simulations of
the model. Note that beyond 3 orders of magnitude are only about 14% of data; B.
Fraction of subjects keeping (maroon), adopting (pink), and being in the Gaussian-like
part of the distribution of S (mostly compromisers; purple) against D.
Impact of the difference between personal and group’s opin-
ions on individual sensitivity to social influence. Figure 2A
shows that, on average, S depends on the distance D =
log(Ep
I
) = Xp −M , between personal and group estimates.
Up to a threshold of t ≈ 2.5 orders of magnitude, there is a
linear cusp relation between S and D. The farther away the
social information M is from a subject’s personal estimate Xp,
the more likely the latter is to trust the group, as S increases.
Figure 2B shows the origin of this correlation: as social infor-
mation gets farther from personal opinion, the probability to
keep one’s opinion (S = 0) decreases, while the probability
to compromise increases. Interestingly, the adopting behavior
does not change with D. The same phenomena have been
observed in the Japan experiment (SI Appendix, Fig. S8).
Model. We now introduce an individual-based model to under-
stand the respective effects of individual sensitivity to social
influence and information quality and quantity on collective
performance and accuracy observed at the group level. In
the model, we simulate a sequence of 20 successive estimates
performed by the agents (not including the virtual experts).
A typical run of the model consists of the following steps, for
a given condition (ρ, τ):
1. An initial condition X0 is chosen at random, according
to the experimental ratios of initial conditions;
2. With probability ρ, the true value 0 is introduced into
the sequence, and with probability (1− ρ), an agent plays;
3. The agent first determines its personal estimate Xp from
a Cauchy distribution f(Xp,mp, σp), restricted to [−7; 7];
4. The agent receives, as social information, the average of
the τ previous final estimates M ;
5. The agent chooses its sensitivity to social influence S
consistently with the results of Figure 1B and 2. In particu-
lar, S is drawn in a Gaussian distribution of mean mg with
probability Pg, or takes the value S = 0 or S = 1 with prob-
ability P0 and P1 = 1 − P0 − Pg. P0 and Pg have a linear
cusp dependence with D = Xp −M , while P1 is kept indepen-
dent of D. For a given value of D, the average sensitivity is
〈S〉 = P0 × 0 + P1 × 1 + Pg ×mg = α + β|D|, where α and
the slope β are extracted from Figure 2A. Pg is hence given
by Pg = (α+ β|D| − P1)/mg. The threshold t is determined
consistently by the condition Smax = α + βt, where Smax is
the value of the plateau beyond t in Figure 2A. The values of
all parameters are reported in SI Appendix, Table S3;
6. S being drawn, the final estimate X is given by equa-
tion 2. One starts again from step 2 for the next agent.
Comparison between theoretical and experimental results.
For all graphs, we ran 100000 simulations so that the model
predictions error bars are negligible. Figure 1B shows that the
distribution of sensitivities to social influence S obtained in
the model (red curve) is similar by construction to the experi-
mental one. Also by construction of the model (step 5. above),
the cusp dependence of the social sensitivity with respect to
D = Xp −M is well reproduced by the model (Figure 2A;
red curve and empty symbols). We now address several non
trivial predictions of the model.
Estimates after social influence. Figure 1A (all values of ρ aggre-
gated) and SI Appendix, Fig. S3 (for each ρ) compare favorably
the distributions of estimates predicted by the model with
the experimental results (before and after social influence).
Social influence leads to the sharpening of the distributions
of estimates, and this effect increases as more information is
provided to the group.
Impact of social information on collective performance. Figure 3
shows the collective performance (precisely defined above)
and the width of the distribution of estimates, for the different
ρ and τ . The collective performance is 0 when the distribution
is centered on the true value, such that the closer it is to 0, the
better. As expected, when ρ = 0%, no significant improvement
is observed in the collective performance. Then, as ρ increases,
the center gets closer to the true value, and the width decreases
accordingly, as also observed in the experiments in Japan (see
SI Appendix, Fig. S9). Note that the experimental error bars
(see SI Appendix for their computation) decrease after social
influence, reflecting the decrease of the width of the estimate
distribution after social influence and the driving of people’s
opinion by the virtual experts. The collective performance and
estimate distribution width predicted by the model (Figure 3;
empty circles) are in good agreement with those observed
in the experiment. The very small effect of τ , only reliably
observed in the model in Figure 3A, is explained in the SI
Appendix. As shown there, a simpler model where we neglect
the dependence of S with D = Xp −M (Figure 2A) can be
analytically solved. It leads to fair predictions (full black lines
on Figure 3), although it tends to underestimate the collective
performance improvement and does not capture the reduction
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Fig. 3. Collective performance, defined as the absolute value of the median of
estimates (A) and width of the distribution of estimates (B), for all (ρ, τ), before
(blue) and after (red) social influence. Both improve with ρ, as well as after social
influence, except for the collective performance at ρ = 0%. Full circles correspond
to experimental data, while empty circles represent the predictions of the full model.
The full black lines are the predictions of the simple solvable model presented in SI
Appendix. For ρ = 60%, only model predictions are available.
of the distribution width already observed at ρ = 0%. This
model guided us to design our experiments and its relative
failure motivated us to investigate the phenomenon illustrated
in Figure 2 and included in the full model described above.
Fig. 4. Collective accuracy (median distance to the truth of individual estimates)
before (blue) and after (red) social influence against ρ, for the 5 behavioral categories
identified in Figure 1B and for the whole group (All). Adopting leads to the sharpest
improvement, and the best accuracy for ρ ≥ 40%. Full circles correspond to experi-
mental data, while empty circles represent the predictions of the model (including for
ρ = 60%, a case not tested experimentally).
Impact of sensitivity to social influence on collective accuracy. Fig-
ure 4 (see SI Appendix, Fig. S11 for an alternative represen-
tation) shows the collective accuracy for the five categories
of behavioral responses identified in Figure 1B, and for the
whole group, before and after social information. Before social
influence, keeping (Figure 4B) leads to the best accuracy while
adopting and overreacting behaviors (Figure 4D and E) are
associated with the worst accuracy. However, as more reliable
information is indirectly provided by the experts, and in par-
ticular for ρ ≥ 40%, adopting and overreacting lead to the
best accuracy after social influence [14, 19]. The contradicting
behavior (Figure 4A) is the only one for which the accuracy
is deteriorating after social influence. Finally, compromising
(Figure 4C) leads to a systematic improvement of the accuracy
as the percentage of experts increases (better than keeping
for ρ ≥ 40%), very similar to that of the whole group (Fig-
ure 4F). The collective accuracy for each behaviorial category
is again fairly well predicted by the model (we discuss below
the disagreement between model predictions and experimental
data in Figure 4D, for the adopters before social influence).
The sensitivity to social influence and the collective ac-
curacy are strongly related to confidence (see SI Appendix,
Fig. S10). The more confident the subjects, the less they tend
to follow the group and the better is their accuracy, espe-
cially before social influence. This makes the link between
confident [18], informed [16], and successful [17] individuals:
they are generally the same persons. Yet, individuals who are
too confident (keeping behavior; arguably because they have
an idea about the answer, hence their good accuracy before
social influence), tend to discard others’ opinion. Although it
might sometimes work – especially if no external information is
provided (ρ = 0%) – they lose the opportunity to benefit from
valuable information learned by others. Meanwhile, adopting
and overreacting subjects have a poor confidence and accuracy
before social influence (Figure 4D and E), arguably because
they do not know much about the question. Note that the
model, not including any notion of confidence or heterogeneous
prior knowledge, overestimates the quality of the accuracy be-
fore social influence for the adopting behavior. Yet, even at
ρ = 0%, adopting subjects perform about as well as the other
categories after social influence. In fact, if enough information
is provided (ρ = 80%), they are even able to reach almost
perfect collective accuracy. Similar results have been found in
the Japan experiment, as shown on SI Appendix, Fig. S12. SI
Appendix, Fig. S13, S14, and S15 show similar graphs for the
collective performance in France and Japan.
Predicting the effect of incorrect information given to the human
group by virtual agents. We used the model to investigate the
influence on the group performance of the quality and quantity
of information delivered to the group, i.e. the value V of the
answer provided by the percentage ρ of virtual agents. In our
experiments, the group was provided with the (log-transform
of the) true value V = 0 (the agents were “experts”). We ex-
pect a deterioration of the collective performance and accuracy
as V moves too far away from 0, and as a greater amount of
incorrect information is delivered to the group (by increasing
ρ). The optimum collective accuracy is reached for V strictly
positive, whatever the value of ρ > 0 (SI Appendix, Fig. S16),
as also predicted by our simple analytical model. Hence, in-
correct information can be beneficial to the group: providing
the group with overestimated values can counterbalance the
human cognitive bias to underestimate quantities [24].
Discussion
Quantifying how social information affects individual estima-
tions and opinions is a crucial step to understanding and
modeling the dynamics of collective choices or opinion forma-
tion [26]. Here, we have measured and modeled the impact
of social information at individual and collective scales in es-
timation tasks with low demonstrability. By controlling the
quantity and quality of information delivered to the subjects,
unbeknownst to them, we have been able to precisely quan-
tify the impact of social influence on group performance. We
also tested and confirmed the cross-cultural generality of our
results by conducting experiments in France and Japan.
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We showed and justified that when individuals have poor
prior knowledge about the questions, the distribution of their
log-transformed estimates is close to a Cauchy distribution.
The distribution of the sensitivity to social influence S is
bell-shaped (contradict, compromise, overreact), with two
additional peaks exactly at S = 0 (keep) and S = 1 (adopt),
which lead to the definition of robust social traits, as checked
by further observing the subjects inclined to follow these
behaviors. When subjects have little prior knowledge, we
found that their sensitivity to social influence increases (linear
cusp) with the difference between their estimate and that
of the group, at variance with what was found in [19], for
questions where subjects had a high prior knowledge.
We used these experimental observation to build and cali-
brate a model that quantitatively predicts the sharpening of
the distribution of individual estimates and the improvement
in collective performance and accuracy, as the amount of good
information provided to the group increases. This model could
be directly applied or straightforwardly adapted to similar
situations where humans have to integrate information from
other people or external sources.
We studied the impact of virtual experts on the group
performance, a methodology allowing to rigorously control the
quantity (ρ) and quality (V ) of the information provided to a
group with little prior knowledge. These virtual experts can
be seen either as an external source of information accessible
to individuals (e.g., Internet, social networks, medias...), or
as a very cohesive (all having the same opinion V ) and over-
confident (all having S = 0) subgroup of the population, as can
happen with “groupthink” [27]. When these experts provide
reliable information to the group, a systematic improvement in
collective performance and accuracy is obtained experimentally
and is quantitatively reproduced by our model. Moreover, if
the experts are not too numerous and the information they give
is slightly above the true value, the model predicts that social
influence can help the group perform even better than when the
truth is provided, as this incorrect information compensates
for the human cognitive bias to underestimate quantities.
We also showed that the sensitivity to social influence is
strongly related to confidence and accuracy: the most confident
subjects are generally the best performers, and tend to weight
the opinion of others less. When the group has access to more
reliable information, this behavior becomes detrimental to
individual and collective accuracy, as too confident individuals
lose the opportunity to benefit from this information.
Overall, we showed that individuals, even when they have
very little prior knowledge about a quantity to estimate, are
able to use information from their peers or from the envi-
ronment, to collectively improve the group performance, as
long as this information is not highly misleading. Ultimately,
getting a better understanding of these influential processes
opens new perspectives to develop information systems aimed
at enhancing cooperation and collaboration in human groups,
thus helping crowds become smarter [28, 29].
Future research will have to focus on the experimental vali-
dation of our theoretical predictions when providing incorrect
information to the group, with the intriguing possibility to
actually improve its performance. It would also be interesting
to study the impact on the group performance of the number
of estimates given as social information (instead of only their
mean), and of revealing the confidence and/or reputation of
those who share these estimates.
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